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Abstract
Longevity risk transfer is a popular choice for annuity providers such
as pension funds. This paper formalizes the trade-off between the cost
and the risk relief of such choice, when the annuity provider uses value-
at-risk to assess risk. Using first-order approximations we show that, if
the transfer is fairly priced and the aim of the fund is to maximize returns,
the funds’ alternatives can be represented in the plane expected return-
VaR. We build a risk-return frontier, along which the optimal transfer
choices of the fund are located and calibrated it to the 2010 UK annuity
and bond market.
The activity of pension funds and their asset managers is likely to be stim-
ulated by both the current and forecasted reduction in public provision of pen-
sions. The high level of public deficit with respect to GDP in a number of
developed countries offers to private providers of annuities a unique opportu-
nity to develop their activity and increase their business. This opportunity goes
hands in hands with major risks, linked to the overall economic and demographic
situation and to the relative inadequacy of theoretical risk management tools
to cope with the many facets of actual businesses. This endangers the growth
and success perspectives of private annuity providers.
Longevity risk - i.e. the risk of unexpected improvements in survivorship -
is by now perceived as an important threat to the safety of annuity providers,
such as pension funds. These institutions run the risk of seeing their liabilities
increase over time, because their members survive more than predicted, i.e. the
actual survival rate is greater than the forecasted one. As of 2007, the exposure
of pension funds and other annuity providers to unexpected improvements in
life expectancy has been computed to be 400 billion USD for the US and UK,
more than 20 trillion USD worldwide (see Loeys, Panigirtzoglou and Ribeiro
(2007)).
Annuity providers are also exposed to financial risks on both assets and
liabilities, as soon as the latter are fairly evaluated. In principle, accounting for
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financial and longevity risk, while looking at both assets and liabilities, seems
to be a very hard task. Even once this measuring task is addressed, by using for
instance a fairly simple model for longevity appraisal, coupled with an equally
simple model for financial risk appraisal, able to provide closed form expressions
for risk measurement, other problems remain. They concern management of
those risks.
An important management problem, which we explore in this paper, is
whether an annuity provider should better transfer longevity risk to a rein-
surer or a special purpose vehicle - as most of the recent deals do - or remaining
exposed to it, while saving on the costs of the transfer. Even if the trade-off
is obvious, assessing its impact without resorting to extensive use of simula-
tions is not easy. This is due to the aforementioned difficulties in measuring
longevity risk on the one side, and to the subtle interactions between longevity
and financial risk on the other. These interactions arise if one considers liability
management only, since the value of the liabilities is subject to interest rate risk,
and - a fortiori - if one considers asset and liability management, as we do.
To anticipate on our results, this paper formalizes the trade-off between the
cost and the risk relief of such choice, when the annuity provider uses value-
at-risk to assess risk. Using first-order approximations we show that, if the
transfer is fairly priced and the aim of the fund is to maximize returns, the
funds’ alternatives can be represented in the plane expected return-VaR. We
build a risk-return frontier, along which the optimal transfer choices of the fund
are located. We disentangle the demographic and financial component of the
overall funds’ risk.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 formalizes our set up for both
demographic and financial risk. Section 2 measures the effects of transferring
versus retaining mortality risk, as well as the effects of financial risk. In order
to do that, it considers also how demographic risk transfer can be fairly priced.
Section 3 presents the conditions or asset strategies for maximizing returns.
Section 4 spells out the consequent trade-offs between risk and return, after
having introduced a VaR measure for the overall risk of assets and liabilities.
Section 5 compares the results of expected return maximizing strategies. This
amounts to computing the risk/return trade-off of the fund strategies and to
disentangle the contributions of demographic and financial losses. Section 6
provides an example using financial and demographic data from the UK market.
Section 7 concludes and compares with related research.
1 Set up
We consider the stylized case of a pension fund which has issued a single annuity
on a head aged x. The fund can either
• transfer demographic risk to a reinsurer - which in turn hedges and prices
it fairly - or
• suffer it without hedging
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At the same time, the fund is supposed to maximize expected financial re-
turns.
We assume that hedging of demographic risk on the part of the reinsurer
and measurement of financial risk on the part of the fund is done up to first
order discrepancies between actual and forecasted interest and survival rates.
We perform a Delta analysis, but provide also the Gamma sensitivities, since the
extension to second order hedges, or Delta-Gamma hedging, is quite obvious.
The issues to be addressed in order to formalize the fund strategies, how they
affect the insurance and financial contracts bought or sold, and the trade-offs
between costs and benefits they entail, are:
1. how to measure demographic and financial risk
2. the effects and cost of transferring demographic risk
3. the effects of choosing an optimal asset mix.
Once risk measuring is formalized, a number of possible fund strategies will
emerge from the combination of transferring/non transferring demographic risk
and managing the asset mix. We assume below that the fund performs the
optimal asset allocation in order to maximize expected returns. The choice of
such an objective function is done for illustrative purposes only. It affects only
the number of bonds in the fund assets. Nowhere we take a view on whether
the fund must maximize expected returns or follow another financial strategy.
So, the choice criterion for the asset mix could be changed without modifying
our method (but modifying the numerical examples).
In order to make measurement and management of demographic and finan-
cial risk feasible in closed form, we place ourselves in a standard, continuous-time
framework. Consider a time interval T = [0, T ] , T <∞, a complete probability
space (Ω,F ,P) and a multidimensional standard Wiener W (ω, t) , t ∈ T . The
space is endowed with the filtration generated by w, Fw = {Ft}. We adopt a
stochastic extension of the classical Gompertz law for mortality description and
we stick to the Hull-White model for interest-rate risk1. In doing so, we assume
that the assets of the pension fund can be invested in bonds or kept as cash.
1.1 Demographic risk
Mortality and longevity risk are described by assuming that death occurs with
an intensity which, instead of being deterministic as in the classical actuarial
framework, is stochastic. This stochastic intensity - or stochastic-mortality -
approach, which is by now quite well known in the literature, has the advantage
of making description of age, period and cohort effects in mortality possible. If
the intensity is described by processes simple enough (linear affine), the survival
1This is the framework we adopted for measuring and hedging - but not for transferring -
the Delta-Gamma risk of the reserves/liabilities in Luciano, Regis, Vigna (2012a,b) . In those
papers risk is either securitized through derivatives or internally offset through the natural
hedge between life and death contracts.
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function is known in closed form and can be calibrated using a parsimonious
number of parameters. In order to reap these advantages, while keeping the
distinction between age, period and cohort effects, we assume that the mortality
intensity of a head aged x at calendar time t - which belongs to generation i
- can be described by a so-called Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, without mean
reversion (OU):
dλi(t) = aiλi(t)dt+ σidWi(t),
where ai > 0, σi > 0, Wi is a standard one-dimensional Brownian motion in
W . In the notation we omit the dependence on x, since once calendar time and
generation or gender are specified, age is uniquely determined. If the generation
is captured by the year of birth, age x is linked to time and generation by the
equality x = t− i.
This intensity extends - with the inclusion of a diffusive term - the classical
Gompertz law
dλi(t) = aiλi(t)dt,
where ai > 0 is the rate of growth of the force of mortality.
Expected intensity increases over age:
Et(λi(t+ ∆t)) = λi(t) exp(ai∆t) = fi(t, t+ ∆t) +
σ2i
2a2i
[1− exp (ai∆t)]2 , (1)
where fi(t, t+∆t) is the forward mortality intensity, i.e. the mortality intensity
at time t+ ∆t, as forecasted at time t.
The instantaneous volatility is constant, while the overall variance increases
exponentially in time:
Vart(λi(t+ ∆t)) = − σ
2
i
2ai
[1− exp (2ai∆t)] . (2)
In order to capture longevity improvements over generations we assume that
there is an intensity process for each generation. This dependence on the gener-
ation - which shows up through the index i - will enter through the parameter
calibration. We calibrate one drift and one diffusion for each generation (and
gender, obviously). This - together with the OU choice - makes the overall
mortality model quite parsimonious2.
On top of being parsimonious, the model provides a closed form for the
survival probability of head x of generation i at any point in time t and up to
any horizon T :
Si(t, T ) = Et
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
λi(s)ds
)]
=
=
Si(0, T )
Si(0, t)
exp [−Xi(t, T )Ii(t)− Yi(t, T )] ,
2If we model all the generations at the same time, in order to capture their correlation
intensities, the number of parameters grows, but can still be kept under control: see Jevtic,
Luciano, Vigna(2012).
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where Si(0, T ) and Si(0, t) are the survival frequencies at time 0
Xi(t, T ) :=
exp(ai(T − t))− 1
ai
,
Yi(t, T ) := −σ
2
i [1− exp (2ait)]Xi(t, T )2
4ai
,
Ii(t) := λi(t)− fi(0, t).
and Ii(t) - the difference between the actual mortality intensity of generation i at
t and its forward value or forecast at time 0, fi(0, t) - is what we interpret as the
mortality or demographic risk factor. It is the discrepancy between realization
and forecast which makes the pension fund exposed to mortality risk.
Please notice that, since we are describing mortality and longevity risk, only
the survival probabilities at the current date (t = 0) are known, while the
probabilities which will be assigned at any future point in time (t > 0) are
random variables. We will see below that this makes the reserves of the pension
fund at any future point in time stochastic, and generates the demographic risk
he has to cover. Randomness enters through the demographic factor Ii(t) and
affects the whole survival curve, namely Si(t, T ) for every T .
1.2 Financial risk
In order to seize the effects of interest rate changes on assets and liabilities we
need to select a model for financial risk. The natural choice is to assume that
interest rates follow an Hull-and-White one-factor model. This is a standard
choice in Financial modelling, able to provide us with closed form formulas for
pricing and hedging, parsimonious but flexible enough to be popular in appli-
cations. In our context, it has the advantage of modelling risk in a fashion
symmetric to demographic risk with an OU intensity. Indeed, the instanta-
neous interest rate in the Hull-White model has the following dynamics under
a measure Q equivalent to P:
dr(t) = g(θ − r(t))dt+ ΣdWF (t), (3)
where θ, g > 0,Σ > 0 and WF is a univariate Brownian motion independent
3 of
Wi for all i. θ is the long-run mean of the short-rate process, while the parameter
g is the speed at which the current level of r is reverting to this value. As a
consequence, the instantaneous rate has expectation and variance equal to
Et [r(t+ ∆t)] = r(t)e−g∆t + θ
[
1− e−g∆t] , (4)
Vart(r(t+ ∆t)) =
Σ2
2g
[1− exp (−2g∆t)] . (5)
3Under the original measure we have W = (W1,W2, ....WN ,W
′
F ) where N is the maximum
number of generations alive in T , while W ′F is the Brownian motion which corresponds to
WF according to Girsanov’ theorem. No arbitrage and completeness is assumed to hold in
the financial market. Independency of financial and actuarial risk is preserved because of the
diffusive nature of uncertainty: see Luciano, Regis, Vigna (2012a).
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The corresponding zero-coupon bond price - if the bond is evaluated at t
and has maturity T - is4
B(t, T ) = EQt
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
r(s)ds
)]
=
=
B(0, T )
B(0, t)
exp
[−X¯(t, T )K(t)− Y¯ (t, T )] ,
where B(0, t), B(0, T ) are the bond prices as observed at time 0 for durations
t, T,
X¯(t, T ) :=
1− exp(−g(T − t))
g
,
Y¯ (t, T ) :=
Σ2
4g
[1− exp(−2gt)] X¯2(t, T ),
and the difference between the time-t actual and forward rate R(0, t):
K(t) := r(t)−R(0, t)
is the financial risk factor, akin to the demographic factor Ii(t). As in the
longevity case, the financial risk factor is the difference between actual and
forecasted rates for time t, where the forecast is done at time 0. It is the only
source of randomness which affects bonds. It is clear that - for any maturity T
- the bond value at any point in time t > 0 is random. Values at time t = 0
only are known. Bond values at t > 0 are subject to changes in case the future
instantaneous rate at time t, r(t), is different from its forecast today, the forward
rate.
1.3 Annuities
Consider an annuity issued on an individual of generation i, aged x at t. Make
the annuity payment per period equal to one, for the sake of simplicity, and
assume that the annuity is fairly priced and reserved. Since we assumed that
financial and demographic risks (Brownian motions) are independent, the cash
flow of the annuity at tenor T has a fair value at time t equal to the product of
the survival probability5 S and the discount factor B:
Si(t, T )B(t, T )
The whole annuity - which lasts until the extreme age ω - is worth
V Ai (t) =
ω−x∑
T=t+1
Si(t, T )B(t, T )
4The short-rate process is given directly under the risk-neutral measure, so that no as-
sumption on the market price of financial risk is needed. The parameters of the interest-rate
market will be calibrated accordingly.
5We implicitly assume that there is no price for demographic risk, so that expectations of
functionals of the intensity - such as the survival probability - under the historical measure P
and the risk-neutral one/ones Q coincide.
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at time t ≥ 0.
2 Risk measurement
2.1 Demographic risk measurement and transfer
With no risk transfer, the fund would incur demographic risk, since at any point
in time t the fair value and reserve V Ai (t) can change because the intensity
process does. It can be shown (see Luciano, Regis, Vigna (2012a)) that such
change can be approximated up to the second order as follows:
∆V AMi (t) = ∆
M
A (t)∆Ii(t) +
1
2
ΓMA (t)∆I
2
i (t), (6)
where the Deltas and Gammas are
∆MA (t) = −
ω−x∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)Si(t, u)Xi(t, u) < 0,
ΓMA (t) =
ω−x∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)Si(t, u)[Xi(t, u)]
2 > 0.
Their signs show that the annuity value is decreasing and convex in the risk
factor.
From now on, we take the point of view of a pension fund which issued such
contract at a price P ≥ V Ai (0) and can
• either run into demographic risk, evaluated at its first order impact ∆MA (t)∆Ii(t),
or
• transfer the risk to a reinsurer or to a special purpose vehicle.
We assume that - when risk is transferred to the reinsurer - the latter covers
it using short death contracts in his portfolio, i.e. death contracts he issued or
absorbed from insurers. This is the so-called natural hedging, which is likely to
be feasible for reinsurers, given the diversification of their portfolios. It is instead
difficult to envisage pension funds who are short (issued) death contracts, i.e.
act as insurers.
We ask ourselves at what fair price the reinsurer can absorb the demographic
risk of the annuity. To this end, we assume that coverage of risk is done by the
reinsurer up to first-order changes. He Delta-covers risk6 by using a position in
6We maintain the assumption of delta - as opposite to delta-gamma - coverage for all
risks below. In principle, going from delta to delta-gamma coverage just requires the use
of additional death contracts and the introduction of more equations. No major conceptual
difference seems to be at stake. For this reason, we disregard the extension in the whole paper.
7
N death contracts on individuals of the same generation, gender and age. At
time t, a death contract which covers the period (t, T ) is priced
V Di (t, T ) =
T∑
u=t+1
B(t, u) [S(t, u− 1)− S(t, u)] .
and is affected by a change in mortality intensity ∆Ii as follows:
∆V Di (t, T ) = ∆
M
D (t, T )∆Ii(t) +
1
2
ΓMD (t, T )∆I
2
i (t)
where
∆MD (t, T ) =
T∑
u=t+1
B(t, u) [−Si(t, u− 1)Xi(t, u− 1) + Si(t, u)Xi(t, u)]> 0,
ΓMD (t, T ) =
T∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)
[
Si(t, u− 1)X2i (t, u− 1)− Si(t, u)X2i (t, u)
]
< 0.
Their signs show that the death contract is increasing and concave in the risk
factor. The position N is determined so that the Delta of the portfolio made by
the annuity - in which the reinsurer is short, since he took demographic risk in
charge - and the death contract is zero:
(−∆MA + N∆MD )∆Ii(t) = 0
N(t, T ) =
∆MA
∆MD
=
=−
∑ω−x
u=t+1B(t, u)Si(t, u)Xi(t, u)∑T
u=t+1B(t, u) [−Si(t, u− 1)Xi(t, u− 1) + Si(t, u)Xi(t, u)]
< 0.
The reinsurer is short the death contract, since the annuity value increases
when longevity is greater than forecasted, while the death value decreases. As a
consequence, the increase in the payments to annuitants due to an unexpected
shock in longevity is compensated by the decrease in the expected payments
due to life-insurance policyholders.
The fair cost of such coverage is the value of the death contracts needed for
hedging:
V (t, T ) = −N
T∑
u=t+1
B(t, u) [Si(t, u− 1)− Si(t, u)] =
=
∑ω−x
u=t+1B(t, u)Si(t, u)Xi(t, u)
∑T
u=t+1B(t, u) [Si(t, u− 1)− Si(t, u)]∑T
u=t+1B(t, u) [−Si(t, u− 1)Xi(t, u− 1) + Si(t, u)Xi(t, u)]
. (7)
We assume that - in order to absorb demographic risk - the reinsurer charges
the fund with a price C which is not smaller than the fair price, C ≥ V (t, T ).
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2.2 Financial risk measurement
After coverage of demographic risk through the reinsurer, the fund is left with
• an amount P − C to invest in financial assets, i.e. bonds. This becomes
P if ever demographic risk is not transferred;
• the financial risk of the annuity. Since the annuity is fairly priced, its
value is indeed subject to interest rate fluctuations.
So, it suffers financial risk on assets and liabilities, as follows.
2.2.1 Assets
Any bond which enters the assets of the fund - for the sake of simplicity we
consider zero-coupon bonds only - is subject to financial risk. Its sensitivity to
changes in K - ∆K - is well known:
∆FB(t, T ) = −B(t, T )X¯(t, T ) < 0, (8)
ΓFB(t, T ) = B(t, T )X¯
2(t, T ) > 0. (9)
Bonds are decreasing and convex in discrepancies between the actual and fore-
casted interest rates.
2.2.2 Liabilities
Also the annuity value, which enters the liabilities, is subject to financial risk,
since it is fairly priced. The effect of a change in K on the annuity is:
∆V AFi (t) = +∆
F
A(t)∆K(t) +
1
2
ΓFA(t)∆K
2(t),
where
∆FA(t) = −
ω−x∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)Si(t, u)X¯(t, u) < 0,
ΓFA(t) =
ω−x∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)S(t, u)[X¯(t, u)]2 > 0.
The sign of these coefficients reveals that the annuity is decreasing and convex
in discrepancies between the actual and forecasted interest rates, exactly as the
bonds are.
We assume that the position in bonds - given the annuity - is chosen so as
to maximize the portfolio (assets and liabilities) expected return. We assume
that the fund can not borrow resources, and can thus invest up to the amount
received as a premium for the annuity, P , net of reinsurance costs (either 0 or
C).7
7Any remaining fund is kept as cash. We assume that cash provides no return and no
risk. This is why it does not appear in the computations below.
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3 Maximizing returns
At time t, the fund can consider maximizing expected returns, by buying8 a
number n of bonds - with fixed maturity T - which stays between 0 and the
ratio of P − C or P to the time−t price of bonds with maturity T . The fund
can indeed invest in assets either P − C, if he transferred demographic risk, or
P , if he did not. As a result, the fund has a portfolio made up by the annuity
(short) and n long bonds, whose instantaneous expected return µ is
µ = Et
[−V FA (t+ dt) + V FA (t) + n [B(t+ dt, T )−B(t, T )]]
Since only the second part depends on n, the fund chooses this number as high
as possible if EtB(t+dt, T ) > B(t, T ), equal to zero in the opposite case. Notice
that this expected return – and all the expectations and variances from now on
– is computed under the historical measure P. The dynamics of the short rate
under P is
dr(t) = (gθ − (g + λσ)r(t))dt+ ΣdW ′F (t), (10)
where θ, g > 0,Σ > 0, λ is the market price of risk, which we assume constant
and W
′
F is a Brownian motion under the historical measure. Under the Hull-
White return hypotheses - and using first order approximations for returns over
the time interval ∆t - this condition is verified if and only if
Et[K(t+ ∆t)−K(t)]∆FB(t, T ) > 0 (11)
i.e.
Et[K(t+ ∆t)] < 0 (12)
since ∆FB is always negative and K(t) = r(t) − R(t, t) = r(t) − r(t) = 0. The
expected value of K(t+ ∆t) under P is9
Et[K(t+ ∆t)] = r(t)e−(g+λΣ)(∆t) +
θg
g + λΣ
[
1− e−(g+λΣ)∆t
]
+
−
(
θ − Σ
2
2g2
)
(1− e−g∆t)− Σ
2
2g2
(1− e−g∆t)e−g − e−g∆tr(t) =
= r(t)e−g∆t
(
e−(λΣ)∆t − 1
)
+ θ
(
g
g + λΣ
− 1
)
+
+θe−g∆t
(
1− ge
−λΣ∆t
g + λΣ
)
+
Σ2
2g2
(
1− e−g∆t)2 .
8This means that we do not want the fund neither to borrow cash in order to invest in
bonds, nor vice versa (issue bonds to hold cash). This constraint can obviously be relaxed.
9The variance of the financial risk factor K is
Vart [K(t+ ∆t)] =
Σ2
2(g + λΣ)
(
1− e−2(g+λΣ)∆t
)
.
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It follows that the optimal position on the bonds is
n∗ =
 (P − C) /B(t, T ) if (12) holds true and demographic risk was transferredP/B(t, T ) if (12) holds true and demographic risk was not transferred
0 otherwise
The financial risk incurred by the fund, as a consequence of this asset policy,
can be evaluated at first order as follows. It is[
−∆V FA (t) +
P − C
B(t, T )
∆FB(t, T )
]
∆K(t) =
=
[
−∆FA(t)−
P − C
B(t, T )
B(t, T )X¯(t, T )
]
∆K(t)
=
[
ω−x∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)Si(t, u)X¯(t, u)− (P − C) X¯(t, T )
]
∆K(t) (13)
if n∗ = (P − C) /B(t, T ). It has the same expression with C = 0 if n∗ =
P/B(t, T ). It is
−∆V FA (t)∆K(t) = −∆FA(t)∆K(t) =
= ∆K(t)
ω−x∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)Si(t, u)X¯(t, u) (14)
if n∗ = 0.
So, if the fund maximizes expected returns, it will be exposed to either (13)
- at most with C = 0 - or (14) - according to the optimal policy n∗.
At the same time, if the fund decided not to transfer demographic risk - with
the usual convention of approximating exposures to the first order - he will be
exposed to a longevity risk of
∆Ii(t)
ω−x∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)Si(t, u)Xi(t, u)
Summing up, one of the following situations can arise:
• the fund has demographic and financial risk. The latter arises from liabil-
ities only, since n∗ = 0, i.e. it turned out to be optimal to keep the assets
in cash. Risks are
∆Ii(t)
ω−x∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)Si(t, u)Xi(t, u)
∆K(t)
ω−x∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)Si(t, u)X¯(t, u) (15)
while maximized expected returns equal
Et
[−V FA (t+ dt) + V FA (t)] ' Et [∆K(t)] ω−x∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)Si(t, u)X¯(t, u) (16)
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• the fund has demographic and financial risk from assets (bonds) and lia-
bilities, since n∗ = P/B. Risks are
∆Ii(t)
ω−x∑
u=t+t+1
B(t, u)Si(t, u)Xi(t, u)
∆K(t)
[
ω−x∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)Si(t, u)X¯(t, u)− PX¯(t, T )
]
(17)
while maximized expected returns equal
Et
[
−V FA (t+ dt) + V FA (t) +
P
B(t, T )
[B(t+ dt, T )−B(t, T )]
]
(18)
' Et [∆K(t)]
[
ω−x∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)Si(t, u)X¯(t, u)− PX¯(t, T )
]
(19)
• the fund has no demographic risk, since he transferred it, and has financial
risk from liabilities only, since n∗ = 0
∆K(t)
ω−x∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)Si(t, u)X¯(t, u) (20)
His maximized expected returns equal
Et
[−V FA (t+ dt) + V FA (t)] (21)
' Et [∆K(t)]
ω−x∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)Si(t, u)X¯(t, u) (22)
• the fund has no demographic risk - which was transferred - and has finan-
cial risk from assets, since n∗ = (P − C)/B, and liabilities. This risk is
equal to
∆K(t)
[
ω−x∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)Si(t, u)X¯(t, u)− (P − C) X¯(t, T )
]
(23)
Its maximized expected returns equal
Et
[
−V FA (t+ dt) + V FA (t) +
P − C
B(t, T )
[B(t+ dt, T )−B(t, T )]
]
(24)
' Et [∆K(t)]
[
ω−x∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)Si(t, u)X¯(t, u)− (P − C) X¯(t, T )
]
(25)
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4 Trade-offs
In order to study the risk-return trade-offs inherent in the four strategies result-
ing from expected return maximization, let us introduce the following notation:
α : =
ω−x∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)Si(t, u)Xi(t, u) > 0
β : =
ω−x∑
u=t+1
B(t, u)Si(t, u)X¯(t, u) > 0
γ : = β − PX¯ < β
δ : = γ + CX¯ > γ
Let us denote as C∗ the amount paid for demographic risk transfer. De-
pending on the fund’s choice, we may have C∗ = C or C∗ = 0. The four
expected-return-maximizing strategies are described in Table 1 by the asset al-
location strategies n∗ and demographic-risk transfer-payment C∗, together with
the risks and net expected returns they entail. Returns are net of the costs C∗
of demographic-risk transfer. So, for strategies 1 and 2 α is the Delta of the
portfolio with respect to mortality risk, while β, γ and δ are the Deltas of the
portfolios for the four strategies with respect to financial risk.
Strategy n∗ C∗ Dem risk Fin risk Net expected return
1 0 0 α∆I β∆K βE [∆K]
2 P/B 0 α∆I γ∆K γE [∆K]
3 0 C 0 β∆K βE [∆K]− C
4 (P-C)/B C 0 δ∆K δE [∆K]− C
Table 1: Risks and expected return
Notice that we subtract the whole cost of reinsurance – which lasts for the
whole annuity maturity, ω−x – even though financial returns are computed over
the next period ∆t. This will make our expected returns low. 10. Each strategy
entails a cash flow, i.e. a liquidity injection or outflow, equal to P −C∗ − n∗B.
In order to compare the strategies we cannot use a standard risk/return frontier,
for at least two reasons. First, we have not measured risk with any synthetic
measure, such as the variance. We have measured it through the change in the
portfolio value - i.e. through the profit/loss - corresponding to every specific
difference between forecasted and actual mortality ∆I or interest rate ∆K. We
have a change in portfolio value for every couple or scenario (∆I, ∆K). Second,
we have two sources of risk, demographic and financial. As a consequence, we
would need a risk/return frontier in three dimensions. In order to reconstruct a
10The model can accomodate any splitting of the reinsurance cost over the maturity of the
annuity
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risk/return trade-off, without loosing the two sources of risk, in the next Section
4.1 we proceed in three steps. We first recognize the link between the scenario-
based risk representation and a Value-at-Risk (VaR) risk measurement for each
risk factor. The second step consists in passing from the VaR of the factor to
the VaR of the portfolio strategy. The third steps consists in summing up the
VaRs due to financial and demographic risk to obtain the Overall VaR.
4.1 One-standard deviation shocks and VaRs
Observe first that the expected values of the risk factors changes, ∆Ii = ∆Ii(t+
∆t) and ∆K = ∆K(t + ∆t) are equal to the expected values of the mortality
intensity and interest rate, λi(t+∆t)) and r(t+∆t), which we computed above,
in (1) and (4), net of the corresponding forward rate. The variances are the
ones computed in (2) and (5). So, using (1), (4), (2) and (5), we can compute
E[∆Ii],Var[∆Ii],E[∆K],Var[∆K].
A synthetic way to compare the four alternative strategies above consists
in looking at what happens if both the mortality and interest rate over the
next instant suffer a shock, i.e. have a realization which is not equal to their
mean, E[∆Ii],E[∆K]. Each move (∆Ii,∆K) different from E[∆Ii],E[∆K], once
substituted in the risk/return triples, provides a scenario-based assessment of
the strategy itself. Consider first a positive or negative one-standard-deviation
shock on the longevity of generation i and on interest rates:
∆Ii = E[∆Ii]± 1×
√
Var[∆Ii] (26)
∆K = E[∆K]± 1×
√
Var[∆K] (27)
It is straightforward to construct from this an evaluation of the VaR-type.
Since both the intensity and the interest rate are Gaussian, indeed, looking at
a one-standard-deviation shock means to examine the worst occurrence for I
and K in 84% or 16% of the cases. Expressions (26) and (27) give the VaR
of the risk factors at the level of confidence 84% - if we take −1 ×√Var[∆Ii]
- and 16%, if we take +1 ×√Var[∆Ii]. By changing the number of standard
deviations examined - bringing it from 1 to 1.65 or 2.33, for instance - we would
be looking at the worst scenarios for I and K in 95% and 5% or 99% and 1% of
the cases. In general, we can fix a confidence level 1−  (say 99, 95, 84) or  at
which the VaR of the risk factors can be evaluated, by choosing appropriately
the constant in front of the standard deviation. Let n() be that constant. So,
the VaR of the two risk factors at the confidence level 1−  is
V aR1−(∆I) = E[∆Ii]− n()
√
Var[∆Ii] (28)
V aR1−(∆K) = E[∆K]− n()
√
Var[∆K] (29)
However, in the end we are interested in the VaR of the portfolio, not in the
VaR of the risk factors. According to Table 1, the realizations of the portfolio
gain/loss are of the type k∆Ii or k∆K, where the constant k can be either
positive or negative (k = α, β, γ, δ). To an increase in the risk factor corresponds
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a portfolio loss if k < 0, a gain if k > 0. This means that the VaR of the portfolio
due to demographic risk, is
kV aR1−(∆Ii) = k
[
E[∆Ii]− n()
√
Var[∆Ii]
]
if k > 0 (30)
kV aR(∆Ii) = k
[
E[∆Ii] + n()
√
Var[∆Ii]
]
if k < 0 (31)
Similarly for interest-rate risk. Table 2 reports the values of the financial and
demographic VaR for each strategy.
Table 2: Demographic and Financial VaR for the four strategies
Contribution to the strategy VaR
Strategy Demographic risk Financial Risk
1 αV aR1−(∆Ii) βV aR1−(∆K)
2
αV aR1−(∆Ii) γV aR1−(∆K) if γ > 0
αV aR1−(∆Ii) γV aR(∆K) if γ < 0
3 0 βV aR1−(∆K)
4
0 δV aR1−(∆K) if δ > 0
0 δV aR(∆K) if δ < 0
Due to independency between financial and actuarial risk sources, if we sum
up the appropriate scenario-based risks or VaRs (where appropriate stands for
”based on the need of selecting V aR versus V aR1−”) we obtain the strategy-
VaR due to both sources of risk. Consider for instance the first strategy, which
has risks (α∆Ii, β∆K). Since both coefficients α and β are positive, the VaR
of the strategy is
αV aR1− (∆Ii) + βV aR1− (∆K)
If we apply a similar reasoning for the other strategies, for each one we can
compute the overall VaR, which we report in Table 3 together with the strategy’s
net expected return. This opens the way to representing the trade-offs of the
strategies in a familiar way, by associating to each strategy a point in the plane
(Overall-VaR, net expected return).
Strategy (VaR,expected return) combination
1 (αV aR1−(∆Ii) + βV aR1−(∆K), βE [∆K])
2
(αV aR1−(∆Ii) + γV aR1−(∆K), γE[∆K]) if γ > 0
(αV aR1−(∆Ii) + γV aR(∆K), γE[∆K]) if γ < 0
3 (βV aR1−(∆K), βE [∆K]− C)
4
(δV aR1−(∆K), δE [∆K]− C) if δ > 0
(δV aR(∆K), δE [∆K]− C) if δ < 0
Table 3: Overall VaR for the strategies
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5 Comparing strategies
In order to state whether demographic risk transfer is worthwhile, we need
to compare specific couples of the strategies listed in Table 1. Indeed, two
alternative couples of strategies can be implemented by the fund: either 1 and 3
or 2 and 4. If condition (12) is not met and the optimal number of bonds turns
out to be zero (n∗ = 0), the choice is between strategies 1 and 3, namely
(α∆I, β∆K,βE [∆K])
(0, β∆K,βE [∆K]− C)
Otherwise, if condition (12) is met and the optimal number of bonds is
positive (n∗ > 0) the choice is between strategies 2 and 4, namely
(α∆I, γ∆K, γE [∆K])
(0, δ∆K, δE [∆K]− C)
We compare the competing strategies in the plane ”Overall-VaR, net ex-
pected return”. Hence, the comparison is between
(αV aR1−(∆Ii) + βV aR1−(∆K), βE [∆K])
(βV aR1−(∆K), βE [∆K]− C)
for strategies 1 and 3,
{
(αV aR1−(∆Ii) + γV aR1−(∆K), γE [∆K]) if γ > 0
(αV aR1−(∆Ii) + γV aR(∆K), γE [∆K]) if γ < 0{
(δV aR1−(∆K), δE [∆K]− C) if δ > 0
(δV aR(∆K), δE [∆K]− C) if δ < 0
for strategies 2 and 4.
Fixing the confidence level  for the VaR, we can represent the combination of
risk and expected return for each strategy on a two-dimensional plot. Actually,
the fund could reinsure just a part of its liabilities against longevity risk, by
choosing C∗ = ηC, η ∈ [0, 1]. In practice, the fund can implement all the linear
combinations of the two alternative strategies 1 and 3 or 2 and 4. It is then
possible to the represent the set of all the possible strategies with a line that
goes from 1 to 3 or from 2 to 4. When n∗ = 0 the set of possible strategies is
characterized by the straight line that crosses 1 and 3 (Figure 1). When instead
condition (12) is met, the set of return maximizing strategies for different values
of η is represented by a broken line between 2 and 4 (Figure 2). In this case
indeed there is no liquidity left, since the fund invests all its available resources
in the bond. The kink of the line corresponds lies in the point at which the
Delta of the portfolio of assets and liabilities – i.e. short the annuity and long
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the bond – with respect to the financial risk is null. If the risk-return preferences
of the fund can be described through a utility function on the plane (Expected
Financial Return, Overall VaR), the best strategy is identified as the point of
the straight line that crosses the highest possible indifference curve, which is
also represented in the figures.
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Figure 1: This figure shows the risk-return combinations of the set of strategies,
for all the possible values of η when n∗ = 0. The strategies are represented by
the black solid line. The dotted curve is the highest indifference curve which
is tangent to the set of strategies. The optimal strategy lies at the intersection
between the curve and the line. On the horizontal axis the VaR at a certain
level  is reported, while the expected financial return net of reinsurance costs
lies on the vertical axis.
In order to appreciate the trade/offs so elicited and the different informations
we can convey on them, we introduce and comment an example calibrated on
UK mortality and financial data.
6 Implementing and comparing strategies on UK
data
We implement the strategies designed above and study their trade-offs using
data from the UK market. To be specific, we consider a whole-life annuity sold
on a UK male head aged 65 at strategy inception, December 30, 2010; we take
financial data from the UK Government market on the same date. We then
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Figure 2: This figure shows the risk-return combinations of the set of strategies,
for all the possible values of η, when n∗ > 0. The strategies are represented by
the black broken line. The dotted curve is the highest indifference curve which
is tangent to the set of strategies. The optimal strategy lies at the intersection
between the curve and the line. On the horizontal axis the VaR at a certain
level  is reported, while the expected financial return net of reinsurance costs
lies on the vertical axis.
presume that the revenues from annuity sales are invested in UK Government
bonds. The Hull-White model is then calibrated under the risk-neutral measure
and its parameters are g = 2.72%, θ = 17.23%, Σ = 0.65%, while the initial
value of the short-rate is r(0) = 0.42%. The market price of risk λ is chosen
so that the long-run mean under the historical measure is around 4%. The
survival rates are calibrated from the historical IML tables. For the generation
we considered, the model parameters are ai = 10.94%, σi = 0.07% and λi(0) =
0.885%. Table 4 summarizes all the relevant parameters.
Table 5 reports the prices and the Deltas of the instruments we use in the
example.
The fair price of the annuity – which is also its selling price – is V A = P =
13.09.11 Being short the annuity, which has exposures ∆MA = −323.48 and
∆FA = −100.92 the fund remains exposed positively to both risk factors change.
The fund operates on the financial market using a 10-year bond, which is priced
B(0, 10) = 0.75576 and has ∆FB = −6.617. We evaluate the hedging strategies
we described above at an horizon ∆t = 1 year. The longevity risk factor I(1)
is instead expected to be positive, E0[I(1)] = 2.73 ∗ 10−7 while its variance is
Var0[I(1)] = 5.47 ∗ 10−7. Demographic risk can be transferred to a reinsurer at
11In the computation, we considered ω = 110 years.
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Table 4: Calibrated parameters
Symbol Value
Financial risk
g 2.72%
Σ 0.65%
θ 17.23%
r(0) 0.42%
Demographic risk
ai 10.94%
σi 0.07%
λi(0) 0.885%
Table 5: Risk exposures and prices of instruments
Figure Symbol Value
Annuity
Price V A 13.09
Exposure to longevity risk ∆MA -323.48
Exposure to financial risk ∆FA -100.92
10-year bond
Price B(0,10) 0.75576
Exposure to financial risk ∆FB -6.617
its fair price C = 2.95. The expected value of the financial risk factor under the
historical measure is slightly negative, equal to E0[K(1)] = −0.04%, while its
variance is Var0[K(1)] = 3.79 ∗ 10−5. As a result of charging expected returns
with the whole reinsurance cost E0[K(1)] − C will be strongly negative. As
remarked in Section 4, we could split C over the life of the annuity.
Since condition (12) is met, the fund maximizes returns by buying as many
bonds as possible, in order to reduce its exposure with respect to financial risk.
The two strategies it can implement are then 2 and 4, depending on the fund’s
intention to cover against demographic risk. The coefficient δ for strategy 4 is
positive, 12.14, while γ which appears in strategy 4 is negative, -13.69. In Table
6 we report the exposures, the expected financial return net of the reinsurance
cost and the remaining liquidity of the two strategies.
Both strategies make use of all the available resources P received as a pre-
mium for the annuity sale and no liquidity is left.
Strategy 2 invests all P in n∗ = 17.32 bonds. It offers a positive expected
return, 0.006, since the fund has negative exposure to financial risk: ∆F =
−13.69. The overall VaR, which is computed at a one-year horizon at a 99.9%
confidence level, is -0.96 and it is due mostly to longevity risk (-0.76). Strategy
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Table 6: Risk exposures, VaR and expected returns
Figure Strategy
Symbol 2 4
Optimal number of bonds n∗ 17.32 13.41
Optimal cost of reinsurance C∗ 0 2.95
Exposure to longevity risk α/0 323.48 0
Exposure to financial risk γ/δ -13.69 12.14
Liquidity P − C∗ − n∗B 0 0
Expected financial return µ 0.007 -2.95
V aR99.9% demographic risk V aR99.9%(∆I) -0.71 0
V aR99.9% financial risk V aR99.9%(∆K) -0.25 -0.23
Overall V aR99.9% V aR99.9% -0.96 -0.23
Overall V aR84% V aR84% -0.31 -0.08
4 hedges against longevity risk and invests the remaining resources P − C to
buy n∗ = 13.42 bonds. The overall VaR is reduced from -0.96 of strategy 2 to
-0.23 on the one side, but expected financial returns are lower (-2.956 vs. 0.007),
mainly because the price of 2.95 is paid for longevity risk reinsurance.
Figure 3 represents the trade-off between risk (measured by overall VaR) and
expected return in place between these two competing strategies. The fund
accepts to deal with a higher risk to obtain a higher expected return if it chooses
to implement strategy 2 over 4.
If we specify a utility function for the fund, defined with respect to expected
returns and overall VaR, the fund can optimally choose between the competing
strategies the strategy that maximizes utility. Let us consider for example a
simple expected utility function
U(µ, V aR) = µ− ξ(V aR99.9%)2,
in which ξ > 0 is a measure of risk aversion correlated with the risk aversion
coefficient.
Let us set it to ξ = 5. Comparing the utility of the two strategies, the fund,
which is highly risk averse would choose strategy 4, for which U = -3.22, over
strategy 2, for which U = - 4.63. We now allow the fund to reinsure a part
η ∈ [0, 1] of its longevity exposure in order to maximize its utility. Figure
4 represents the set of possible strategies, which is the line between 2 and 4,
and the highest indifference curve that crosses this set. The tangency point
determines the optimal fund strategy. In the figure, the dotted line represents
the highest possible indifference curve which is tangent to the set of possible fund
strategies. The optimal strategy for this fund implies reinsuring η = 52.99% of
the longevity exposure (at a cost of 1.56) and buying 15.25 bonds. Notice that
this optimal strategy has no exposure to financial risk. The optimal strategy is
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Figure 3: This figure shows the risk-return combinations of strategies 2 and 4.
On the horizontal axis the VaR at level 99.9% is reported, while the expected
financial return net of reinsurance costs lies on the vertical axis.
then characterized by
U∗ = −2.13
which is way higher than the one of strategy 4, a
V aR = −0.34
and an instantaneous expected return µ = −1.563, which includes a reinsurance
cost of 1.56.
7 Conclusions and related research
This paper explores the overall risk-return trade-off of a pension fund when
it is possible to transfer longevity risk and the fund chooses optimally its asset
allocation. We measured this trade-off in terms of risk/return combinations and
we assessed risk through Value-at-risk from both financial and longevity shocks.
We succeeded in quantifying the trade/off and we represented it in the plane
expected return-VaR. The optimal transfer choices of the fund are located along
the corresponding frontier. We provided a fully calibrated example in which
partial retention may be optimal.
Our paper differs from most of the literature in pension fund’s management,
in which either the mortality of beneficiaries is not modelled directly – see for
instance Josa-Fombellida and Rincon-Zapatero (2010) – or the intensity is de-
terministic (Hainaut and Devolder (2007)). As a consequence, demographic risk
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Figure 4: This figure shows the risk-return combinations of the set of strategies
(the broken line between 2 and 4) once partial longevity reinsurance is admitted.
On the horizontal axis the VaR at level 99.9% is reported, while the expected
financial return net of reinsurance costs lies on the vertical axis. The dotted
line represents the highest possible indifference curve of the utility function that
crosses the set of strategies.
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transfer is not examined since the longevity risk issue is not tackled. It differs
also from the flourishing literature on the possibility of transferring demographic
risk through the financial market, using s-forward, q-forwards or other over-the-
counter products. For a review on these alternative transfer possibilities, we
address the reader to Biffis and Blake (2010a). That literature indeed focuses
on ways to alleviate the cost of the transfer, or make it fairly priced, not on the
optimal retention.
A paper which addresses the optimal retention, but is centered on asymmet-
ric information about longevity risk, is Biffis and Blake (2010b). In their case
the optimal retention does not come from a risk/return trade-off, but aims at
trading-off the overpricing due to low information of the longevity buyer (when
retention is low) and the cost of capital (when retention is high).
Our analysis could be extended to the case in which the fund is subject to
regulatory capital requirements. If we link – as we could easily do – our VaR
measure to the capital requirement of the fund, the capital absorption and its
cost enter our picture in quite a straightforward way.
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